
































A large number of econometric studies have examined the impact of
central exit examinations on student attainment and repeatedly found
a positive eﬀect. This paper contributes to clarify the term central exit
examination by distinguishing between central assignment and central
grading. For this purpose, I use a study from Birkenfeld und Hanafy
(2008), who have gathered the relevant information for the 16 German
federal states. First econonometric analyses show, that the distinction
between central assignment and central grading is indeed fruitful.
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Diﬀerent countries’ school systems vary in a number of characteristics. The
support in early childhood is relevant for later school attainment as well as
the initial and further training of teaching staﬀ or institutions regulating
the operation of schools. Within the latter, various studies have found the
existence of central exit examinations to be of major importance.
Bishop (1999, 354f) and Bishop und W¨ oßmann (2004, 14-16) state three
channels, by which central exit examinations lead to improved student at-
tainment.
1. greater reward for students’ eﬀort: The grade now allows comparing
yourself with all students who took the same exit examination, not only
with your class-mates.
2. less peer-pressure to prevent students from learning and participating
in class: If the teacher is responsible for the exit examination, it can be
rational for weaker students by disturbance to keep the level of teaching
low.
3. better surveillance of teachers and schools: Just as the disturbed teach-
ing will no longer lead to easier exams, also a weak teacher will no longer
be able to compensate bad teaching with generous grading.1
In the principal-agent-model formulated by Bishop und W¨ oßmann (2004),
all three channels lead to higher student eﬀort – and to higher government
spending for schools.2 Both will again lead to better school quality.
1For the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (no central exit examinations
in 1998), an investigation showed, that about 10% of the Abitur-tests were graded too
generous (Voss, 1998, 5).
2The government acts as principal, the (homogeneous) students as agents. Government
spending depends positively on student eﬀort, due to a Cobb-Douglas production function
with arguments ability, eﬀort, and government spending. Therefore higher spending is
worth more when student eﬀort is higher.
1Whenever teachers grade their students diﬀerently, comparability within a
larger group is reduced. On the other hand, diﬀerentiated grading might be
helpful to increase student eﬀort. Zubrickas (2008) shows within a principal-
agent-model that teachers give better grades when they assume the average
performance to be low. In this way they want to motivate the students.
Another aspect of central exams is their low frequency due to high costs.
Therefore the students’ day’s form is rather inﬂuential, which makes central
exams a little less reliable (De Paola und Scoppa, 2008).
In a survey, Bishop (1997) discusses three studies, which each for itself shows,
that exit examinations which are oriented at external curricula go with higher
student attainment.
In Sweden, a system of central exit examinations was abolished in the 1970s.
Bishop (1999) uses this reform to show that Swedish students afterwards took
less demanding courses3 and did worse in international comparisons later
on. Furthermore, Bishop (1999) analyzes various countries and Canadian
provinces by looking at four student assessment studies.4 He ﬁnds, that
students who ﬁnish their school career with a central exam do comparably
better.
W¨ oßmann (2003, 140) uses TIMSS-data and ﬁnds large diﬀerences in the
attainment of students from countries with and without central exit exam-
inations. His deﬁnition ”some kind of centralized examination in the sense
that a central decision-making authority has exclusive responsibility or gives
approval of the content of examinations” seems rather wide. However, only
15 of the 30 countries fulﬁll it.
3Many students took courses, which should prepare them for vocational training instead
of courses meant to prepare for university. The universities however had to treat both types
of courses equally for admission.
4The Third International Math and Science Study (TIMSS), the International Associ-
ation of Evaluation of Educational Achievement literacy study, the International Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (IAEP) and school data of 13-year-olds from nine Canadian
provinces.
2Fuchs und W¨ oßmann (2007) analyze the impact of central exit examina-
tions on student attainment in the ﬁelds of mathematics, reading and sci-
ence with PISA-2000 data. There is a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect only for
maths. (Fuchs und W¨ oßmann (2007) derive their distinction of countries
from Bishop (2006).)
In a country-level analysis J¨ urges und Schneider (2004) only ﬁnd a small and
contradictory inﬂuence of central exit examinations. Yet they are aware, that
the analysis of student attainment on this aggregated level might be severely
inﬂuenced by outliers. Concerning the distinction of countries, they refer to
Bishop (1999).
Using TIMSS- and PISA-data, W¨ oßmann (2005) investigates the inﬂuence of
central exit examinations on student attainment. His main ﬁndings are that
central exit examinations are more valuable for good than for bad students,
that they reduce the disadvantages of immigrant and working class children
and they are complementary to a high level of school autonomy.
Within the German educational federalism such diﬀerences can also be iden-
tiﬁed. As many of the other macro variables are identical within Germany,
the German federal states are ideal for this evaluation.
With a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach, J¨ urges et. al. (2005) use TIMSS-
data on the level of German federal states and ﬁnd a positive eﬀect for
German lower secondary schools, amounting to about a third of a school year.
They do so by comparing results in maths (partly central exit examinations)
and sciences (no central examination).
B¨ uchel et. al. (2004) extend the approach of J¨ urges et. al. (2005) by a
signaling-model. They ﬁnd that grades are closer to the real attainment,
when standards are deﬁned centrally. Therefore, grades from a federal state
with central exams are a better signal for potential employers. Instead of
grades (which are not in the data), B¨ uchel et. al. (2004) refer to the stu-
dent’s self-estimation. However, this should not question their results.
Backes-Gellner und Veen (2006) also use a signaling model (Backes-Gellner
und Weckm¨ uller, 1998) to follow the hypothesis that the ratio of students
3taking the Abitur5 will increase stronger over time in federal states without
central exams. They argue that this should be due to ever decreasing require-
ments. Data from the federal statistical oﬃce from 1970 to 2002 support the
hypothesis.
Furthermore, they expect higher wages for students who took the Abitur in
a federal state with central examinations, since such a certiﬁcate signals a
higher level of ability and/or attainment. However, this hypothesis is not
supported by the data which means that German employers are not able or
not willing to use this signal.
W¨ oßmann (2007) uses macro variables and aggregated PISA-2000-data on
the level of German federal states to estimate the inﬂuence of central exit
examinations, age of selection into diﬀerent school tracks, and the share of
students at private schools. Central exams improve student attainment but
do not inﬂuence equality6.
Whenever studies simply state that Germany is a country with central exit
examinations, the authors leave unused a lot of variation within this variable.
A distinction must be made between the federal states as well as between the
(up to) three German school tracks.7 Moreover, studies which simply allocate
German federal states to two groups (one with and one without central exit
examinations) fall short.8 The ﬁrst (greater reward) and the second channel
(less peer-pressure) described by Bishop (1999) might work with central as-
signment of tests alone. But for the third one (better surveillance), central
grading of the tests is inevitable.
5The Abitur is the school leaving certiﬁcate of the most demanding school track in
Germany.
6A strong inﬂuence of family background is deﬁned as inequality.
7The three school tracks in Germany (in increasingly demanding order) are:
Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium. Four federal states have completely amalga-
mated Hauptschule and Realschule but all states still oﬀer the three diﬀerent school leaving
certiﬁcates.
8Bade und Strebe (1993) give a short survey on the diﬀering use of the term central
Abitur. They especially show the diﬀerences between Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria.
42 Data
An overview concerning central assignment and central grading at exit ex-
aminations in German federal states is provided by Birkenfeld und Hanafy
(2008). Tables 1 to 3 show their results for 2000, 2003 and 2006. The
columns show whether the respective school leaving certiﬁcate is at least
partially based on a central test. For each of the three certiﬁcates, the ﬁrst
column stands for central assignment and the second column stands for cen-
tral grading. I say the grading is central, when the ﬁnal decision about the
grades is in the hand of an expert who is not working at the school where
the respective student was taught.
2.1 Results from PISA as a measure
In order to be able to make statements about the impact of central grading of
external exit examinations we need an unbiased measure; a variable that can
be used as regressand. Average grades of school leaving certiﬁcates obviously
cannot be used, as they are not comparable across federal states’ borders.
Instead, I will use data from two PISA studies. As the tested students were
15-year-olds, this measure is rather close to the school leaving age.
For the years 2000, 2003 and 2006 there are results available in four areas
(mathematics, reading, sciences, not in 2000: problem-solving) for about
5000 German students9 from the respective PISA-studies. In the extended
German study PISA-E there are even 45000 and 50000 students.10
However, comparisons between the federal states are impossible with these
data. Neither in the OECD’s international nor in the PISA-E dataset are
the individual federal states made public.
For 2000 and 2003 at least averages for the federal states were published.11
The values for the 2006 test will be available in autumn 2008.
9Artelt et. al. (2001, 6), Prenzel et. al. (2007, 4)
10Artelt et. al. (2001, 6), Prenzel et. al. (2005b, 4)
11Baumert et. al. (2003b, 61), Prenzel et. al. (2005a, 60, 88, 106, 128)
5Hauptschule Realschule Gymnasium
assign. grading assign. grading assign. grading
Baden-
Wurttemberg yes no yes yes yes yes
Bavaria no no yes no yes no
Berlin no no no no no no
Brandenburg no no no no no no
Bremen no no no no no no
Hamburg no no no no no no




no no yes no yes no
Lower Saxony no no no no no no
North Rhine-
Westphalia no no no no no no
Rhineland-
Palatinate no no no no no no
Saarland no no no no yes no
Saxony no no yes no yes no
Saxony-
Anhalt no no yes no yes no
Schleswig-
Holstein no no no no no no
Thuringia no no yes no yes no
Table 1: Central exit examinations 2000
6Hauptschule Realschule Gymnasium
assign. grading assign. grading assign. grading
Baden-
Wurttemberg yes no yes yes yes yes
Bavaria no no yes no yes no
Berlin no no no no no no
Brandenburg yes no yes no no no
Bremen no no no no no no
Hamburg no no no no no no




no no yes no yes no
Lower Saxony no no no no no no
North Rhine-
Westphalia no no no no no no
Rhineland-
Palatinate no no no no no no
Saarland yes no yes no yes no
Saxony no no yes no yes yes
Saxony-
Anhalt no no yes no yes no
Schleswig-
Holstein no no no no no no
Thuringia no no yes no yes no
Table 2: Central exit examinations 2003
7Hauptschule Realschule Gymnasium
assign. grading assign. grading assign. grading
Baden-
Wurttemberg yes no yes yes yes yes
Bavaria no no yes no yes no
Berlin no no yes no yes yes
Brandenburg yes no yes no yes no
Bremen yes no yes no yes no
Hamburg yes no yes no yes no




no no yes no yes no
Lower Saxony yes no yes no yes no
North Rhine-
Westphalia yes no yes no yes no
Rhineland-
Palatinate no no no no no no
Saarland yes no yes no yes no
Saxony yes no yes no yes yes
Saxony-
Anhalt no no yes no yes no
Schleswig-
Holstein no no no no no no
Thuringia no no yes no yes no
Table 3: Central exit examinations 2006
82.2 Estimations
The distribution of students over the three diﬀerent school tracks varies
widely between the German federal states (Schnepf (2002, 26-29), Birken-
feld und Hanafy (2008)). To take account of this diﬀerence, the dummies
from tables 1 and 2 shall be weighted with the number of students that ﬁn-
ished the respective track in the respective year. The explaining variables
central assignment and central grading will therefore not be dummies but
ratios. Table 4 displays the results.
The higher the proportion of students who ﬁnish school with a central exit
examination, the higher the federal state’s average PISA score should be.
The ratio of students attending the most advanced secondary school track
(Gymnasium) shall be added as a control variable. Table 5 shows that this
Abiturienten12-ratio varies from 20,0 (Bavaria) to 32,8 per cent (Berlin) be-
tween the federal states.13 There might be some causal negative dependency
between central Abitur and the ratio of Abiturienten (Backes-Gellner und
Veen, 2006). Nevertheless, the Abiturienten-ratio will also be inﬂuenced by
the more or less restrictive admission to Gymnasium. In some federal states
the parents decide about the track, in others teachers do (Birkenfeld und
Hanafy, 2008).
As the students’ ability can well be inﬂuenced strongly by their socio-economic
background (especially for Germany: Sch¨ utz et. al. (2008)), suitable control
variables need to be employed. For 2003, there are averages available on
the federal state level on socio-economic status, father’s employment, educa-
tion of parents and migration background (Prenzel et. al. (2005a), W¨ oßmann
(2007, 29)). For 2000, only migration background (Baumert et. al., 2003b,
247) and mother’s employment (Baumert et. al., 2003b, 381) are available.
In order to include both PISA years in the analysis, I use data which are
in close relation to those published by Baumert et. al. (2003b) and Prenzel
12School leavers at Gymnasium are called Abiturienten.
13”School leavers as proportion of the overall residents of the same age” (Kultusminis-
terkonferenz, 2007, 367)
92000 2003 2006
assign. grad. assign. grad. assign. grad.
Baden-
Wurttemberg 1.00 0.65 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.24
Bavaria 0.60 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.65 0.00
Berlin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.40
Brandenburg 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.00
Bremen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Hamburg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00




0.77 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.80 0.00
Lower Saxony 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
North Rhine-
Westphalia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Rhineland-
Palatinate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saarland 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Saxony 0.87 0.30 0.86 0.27 1.00 0.31
Saxony-
Anhalt 0.87 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.85 0.00
Schleswig-
Holstein 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thuringia 0.79 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.85 0.00
Table 4: Central exit examination as proportion of all exit examinations
avg. std.dev. min. max.
centr. assign. 0.42 0.42 0.00 1.00
centr. grading 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.65
Abiturienten-ratio 27.8 3.6 20.0 32.8
GDP per cap. 24878 7289.4 16437 44980
employment ratio men 69.67 4.82 60.8 78.5
city state 0.19 0.4 0 1
east-Germany 0.38 0.49 0 1
ratio cons. party 46.2 9.22 32.3 69.1
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (30 observations in 2000 and 2003)
10math reading science problem-
solving
constant 430.68∗∗ 401.37∗∗∗ 437.08∗∗∗ 464.73∗∗∗
centr. assignment 5.57 0.94 5.38 −5.44
centr. grading 5.39 13.25 8.41 7.91
2003 8.89∗ 7.47(∗) 12.65∗ –
Abiturienten-ratio −1.33∗ −0.66 −1.03 −1.98∗
GDP per capita 0.85 0.45 1.06 1.37
employment-ratio 0.50 0.66 0.51 0.56
city state −10.51 −5.50 2.41 −0.84
east Germany 15.71 6.07 7.13 26.59(∗)
ratio cons. party 0.70∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.38
N 30 30 30 16
R2 0.809 0.708 0.775 0.725
corr. R2 0.723 0.577 0.674 0.411
***: signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10%-level,
(*): signiﬁcant at the 11%-level
Table 6: Estimations
et. al. (2005a): GDP per capita and employment of males (see also Gundlach
und W¨ oßmann (2004, 44)). Table 5 shows the respective control variables.
To account for possible further relevant diﬀerences in the populace between
the federal states, I include dummies for the three city states and the six east
German states. Furthermore, a relationship between a conservative attitude
and a positive valuation of education is often assumed. As conservative
governments might prefer central exit examinations, the true inﬂuence of
this policy might be overestimated. I therefore introduce a control for the
electorate’s conservative attitude (share of votes for the conservative party
CDU/CSU as part of votes for both big parties (CDU/CSU plus SPD) at
the last nationwide election).
The variables are in line with the literature and especially with W¨ oßmann
(2007).
Table 6 shows the results of the regressions for the four parts of the PISA
tests. There are only 30 observations, since Berlin and Hamburg are missing
11in 2000. Problem-solving was not tested in 2000, therefor this regression
covers only 16 observations (and no 2003 dummy).
Neither the central assignment, nor the central grading have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the average student attainment in a federal state.
The controls do lead to a high degree of collinearity. The explaining variable
central grading however does not suﬀer from this: The variance inﬂation
factor (Belsley et. al., 1980, 93) for central grading is always smaller than 4
(Fox, 1997, 339 and 343). For GDP and employment ratio it is way above
this threshold. For dummies, this number is not suitable. In the principal
components analysis, the condition index is 33, 43 and 147 respectively for
the three last components. These values are rated as high (Belsley et. al.,
1980, 96 and 105). The rule of thumb stated by Belsley et. al. (1980, 117)
which indicates collinearity when several variables load with more than 0.5
on a component with high condition index also suggests that only controls
are aﬀected.
Still, the coeﬃcients point in the expected direction: Central grading (which
only exists in line with central assignment) seems to be more important than
central assignment alone.
These results explicitly contradict those of W¨ oßmann (2007, 37). He had
central assignment highly signiﬁcant in various models. When comparing
his variable with the values in table 2 of this paper, it becomes clear that
W¨ oßmann (2007, 36) is merely referring to the central Abitur, which should
not inﬂuence the attainment of students in the two lower tracks Hauptschule
and Realschule. I therefore suppose, that an omitted variable has a stronger
inﬂuence in his work than in mine. Maybe this is because the values of
central assignment here are often smaller than in W¨ oßmann (2007). For
Bavaria in 2003 (central assignment at Realschule and Gymnasium, though
not at Hauptschule) my value is 0.62 and not 1.00.
Teachers and students in the three diﬀerent German school tracks are not
necessarily inﬂuenced and impressed equally by central exit examinations. I
therefore analyze the impacts separately for the respective tracks. Controls
stay the same.
12math reading science problem-
solving
constant 562,80∗∗∗ 550,89∗∗∗ 585,92∗∗∗ 628,70∗∗∗
centr. assign. 1,90 −0,85 2,78 −8,44∗
centr. grading 0,71 7,69 8,22 7,73(∗)
2003 12,47∗∗∗ 4,20(∗) 17,63∗∗∗ –
Abiturienten-ratio −2,11∗∗∗ −0,72 −1,41(∗) −1,70∗∗
GDP per capita 0,33 −0,49 −1,77(∗) 0,75
employment-ratio 0,52 0,47 0,27 −0,68
city state −0,41∗∗ 4,10 14,11∗ 2,03
east-Germany 10,40 −7,21 −3,49 8,04
ratio cons. party 0,41(∗) 0,48∗ 0,50∗ 0,68∗∗
N 32 32 32 16
R2 0,824 0,672 0,757 0,835
corr. R2 0,752 0,538 0,658 0,646
***: signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10%-level,
(*): signiﬁcant at the 11%-level
Table 7: Estimations (Gymnasium only)
2.2.1 Gymnasium
As central Abitur appeared to be signiﬁcant in W¨ oßmann (2007), Gymnasium
shall be analyzed ﬁrst. Average PISA scores are available for all federal states
(Baumert et. al. (2003b, 69), Prenzel et. al. (2005a, 77, 97, 117, 136)).
The explaining variable is no longer a ratio but a dummy, as I am dealing with
a single school track now. The dependent variable is federal state averages
in PISA-2000 and -2003.
The ratio of student taking the Abitur stays in the regression. If some federal
states have tighter admission regulation than others, this should increase
their average score in the highest track.
Table 7 displays the results. There is a signiﬁcant impact (11%-level) of
central grading14 on student attainment in problem-solving. However this
model has only 16 observations. The signiﬁcance of the diﬀerent controls is
deceptive due to collinearity.
142003: Baden-Wurttemberg and Saxony
13As for the average over all tracks, it can also be stated for the Gymnasium
that a proof for the importance of central grading is hard to ﬁnd. A positive
sign on an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient is all there is.
2.2.2 Realschule
As far as I know, there are no oﬃcial data available for federal state averages
in PISA-scores for the school track of Realschule. However, the Association
of German Realschule-teachers (Verband Deutscher Realschullehrer, VDR)
has published such numbers for 2003 on its website.15 Moreover, the numbers
for Bavaria in 2000 are available at BRLV (2002, 20).
For Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, there are no values
given, as according to the VDR in these federal states no distinct Realschulen
are in Operation. All federal states enter the regression. There will be
dummy (SSST) introduced for the above mentioned.
Table 8 shows the results. Again the point estimates are insigniﬁcant but
have the expected sign.
There was no central grading at the lowest track (Hauptschule).
3 Conclusions
Only ﬁrst econometric indications could be found for the hypothesis that
central grading via increased teacher and student eﬀort should lead to better
student attainment: Insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, which do possess the expected
sign however. Collinearity does not aﬀect this statement (Belsley et. al.,
1980, 116).
The levels of signiﬁcance for central grading at Gymnasium are at 12% for
reading and at 11% for problem-solving. At Realschule, not a single coef-
ﬁcient reaches the 50%-level. The low variance of the explaining variables
(tables 4 and 5) which is due to my using averages on the level of the federal
states has its share in these insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.
15www.vdr-bund.de/PDF-Download/PISA-2003 Vergleich der Laender.pdf
14math reading science problem-
solving
constant 514.15∗∗∗ 503.64∗∗∗ 553.60∗∗∗ 513.55∗∗∗
centr. assign. −8.51 −12.50 −12.24 −13.49
centr. grading 3.83 8.30 8.35 0.72
Abiturienten-ratio −4.08∗ -2.94 −3.86∗ −3.73∗
GDP per capita 0.73 0.77 0.52 0.96
employment-ratio 0.38 −0.17 −0.17 0.57
city state −1.15 −4.17 −2.63 −3.04
east-Germany 19.84 5.33 5.00 19.29
ratio cons. party 1.11∗ 1.50∗ 1.24 0.85
SSST-Dummy −19.24∗ −26.22∗ −18.46 −26.69∗∗
N 16 16 16 16
R2 0.890 0.889 0.882 0.889
corr. R2 0.724 0.724 0.705 0.723
***: signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, **: signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, *: signiﬁcant at the 10%-level,
(*): signiﬁcant at the 11%-level
Table 8: Estimations (Realschule 2003)
At least an indication that a central exit examination should also include
central grading can be found as a result. However, this is way more likely for
the highest school track (Gymnasium) than for the middle one (Realschule).
It would be very helpful to use micro data for this kind of analysis. In
connection with the categorization in tables 1 to 3, this would lead to higher
variance of the explaining variables and might thus increase the coeﬃcients’
signiﬁcance. There is a dataset, which additionally to each student and
her family background also contains the federal state and the school track.
This dataset should be made accessible to researches. Maybe the presented
categorization will then be used for further work.
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